

## EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS IN LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION

BY

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS IN LOGISTICS  
TRANSFORMATION**

by

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United States Army

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## **ABSTRACT**

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Under the Army of Excellence (AOE) structure, the logistics organizations Main Support Battalions (MSBs) and Forward Support Battalions (FSBs) were assigned to the Division Support Command (DISCOM), commanded by a logistics Colonel. FSBs were either attached or assigned to their supported maneuver brigades during tactical operations or remained assigned to the DISCOM with a direct support relationship to their maneuver brigades. This Command and Control (C2) arrangement allowed the DISCOM to direct logistics operations across the division. Under modularity, Brigade Support Battalions (BSB) are assigned to their supported maneuver Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) and are missioned by their commanders, a logistics Lieutenant Colonel (the senior logistics officer in the BCT). Currently, Sustainment Brigades, commanded by a logistics Colonel, are assigned to the Theater Support Command and have no directive authority for logistics since they are not assigned to divisions and don't C2 BSBs. I intend to examine the process of the new sustainment models in order to judge the adequacy of support and effectiveness of the C2 relationships of the division's brigade support battalions and the sustainment brigade under the modular concept.





## EFFECTIVENESS OF COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS IN LOGISTICS TRANSFORMATION

### Logistics Transformation

I have found that effective relationships are the single most important factor when dealing with senior leaders. The personality of a leader coupled with personal and professional relationships makes a big difference on how transformation is received and how logistics is executed in garrison and in war. The United States Army has almost completed its logistics transformation. The Army Posture Statement that existed in 2007 provided strategic level goals for sustainment leadership.<sup>1</sup> From this posture statement, the logistics community employed a shift in sustainment thinking to a modular logistics formation with a single logistics commander in theater who would have overall responsibility for force sustainment operations within a given Area of Responsibility (AOR). Although this Theater Support Commander would have overall responsibility for logistics and may be able to influence logistics decisions on the battlefield, neither he nor his Sustainment Brigade Commanders command or control logistics operations at or below the division level. Thus, the importance of the relationships between the division Deputy Commanding General for Support (DCG-S), the division Assistant Chief of Staff for Logistics (G4) and the Sustainment Brigade Commander who provides the coordination required to sustain the forces.

This personal experience monograph will highlight some lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), how logistics transformation changed and affected logistics units at the division level and below as well as changes in the division G4 roles and responsibilities. I will also examine command and control relationships with regards to coordination and synchronization,

discuss centralized versus decentralized sustainment operations and conclude with recommendations to employ changes to the command and control relationships between theater sustainment brigades and division sustainment organizations.

#### Lessons Learned during ODS and OIF

Although the success of Operation Desert Storm was a great accomplishment for our U.S. Army and its logisticians, there were some shortfalls that led to current changes in our logistics systems. As a shop officer in the Main Support Battalion (MSB) of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Armored Division (3d AD) during Operation Desert Shield/Storm, I recall many challenges with logistical systems across the battlefield. Sustainment unit deficits included shortages of enhanced logistics automation for asset visibility, adequate command and control devices such as radios and global positioning systems (GPS) and soldier enhancement items such as night vision devices (NVD). In our 274-soldier maintenance company alone, we were issued only five pair of NVDs for the unit and one GPS for our company commander. It was also apparent that logisticians at the company and battalion level in the Forward Support Battalions (FSBs) and MSB did not know the overall division and maneuver brigade level tactical plans and how the operations of our companies and battalions nested into the overall plan. Without a clear understanding, we were sometimes dysfunctional, resulting in piles of unused ammunition, repair parts and bulk fuel stocks to be improperly stored at Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) in our AOR. In addition, I recall fellow shop officers in the FSBs stating their battalions were too small to support the armored and infantry battalions in the brigades. Our company was also given the task to maintain all of the Operational Readiness Float equipment in the division which consisted of mostly M1A2

tanks and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV), a mission we were not resourced to execute. This task should have been assigned to the Corps Support Group (CSG) in our AOR. In my position, I was unsure of which CSG was in direct support of our battalion or if one was even assigned to our AOR. Desert Storm lessons learned led to many changes in our current modular sustainment units to include personnel and equipment increases, improvements in automation, more command and control systems, improved distribution technologies and most importantly, reshaping command and control (C2) relationships with the assignment of our support battalions to the maneuver brigades.

Although I did not deploy to OIF with the 25<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (25<sup>th</sup> ID) in 2006-2007, as the outgoing commander of the 225<sup>th</sup> BSB in the Stryker Brigade and the incoming division G4, I conducted weekly Video Teleconferences (VTC) with the deployed DCG-S and division G4 in regards to logistics operations in theater. In addition, I conducted one interview with the Support Operations cell of the sustainment brigade that supported the 25<sup>th</sup> ID in theater.<sup>2</sup> The command and support relationship between the sustainment brigade and their supported units to include the 25<sup>th</sup> ID was not well defined by the Theater Support Command (TSC)/Expeditionary Support Command (ESC) or the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) headquarters in theater. Although the guidance was to maintain operational reach for all maneuver and division commanders, the main issue was a material and distribution management weakness caused by the lack of information and communication on how the sustainment brigade commander and staff interacted with the logistics leaders and BSB commanders of the division.<sup>3</sup> The sustainment brigade did not possess the authority or responsibility to dictate issue or material disposition within the divisional

units.<sup>4</sup> This caused a lack of synchronization throughout the division area. This responsibility should have come from echelons above the division and TSC (e.g. CFLCC or Multinational Forces Iraq). Another issue was the lack of a defined reporting system. Logistics data and information flow throughout the AOR was not standardized. This caused too many variations of logistics reports being tracked and managed between the division and the sustainment brigade. Although the Battle Command Support Sustainment System (BCS3) was deployed into theater, it was not being properly utilized by either the division or the non divisional units in the AOR.<sup>5</sup> There were some occasions when staff interaction and synchronization occurred between the sustainment brigade's Support Operations Officer (SPO) cell and BCT logistics staff where the division G4 was left totally out of the loop.<sup>6</sup> At times, this coordination was even executed at the higher distribution management center at the ESC. This caused tremendous strain on the sustainment brigade's SPO as the fusion center, especially without defined report flow procedures.<sup>7</sup> On occasion, this alienated the division G4 who had to either call the sustainment brigade SPO or the BCT SPOs for logistics information. The last point of concern was the integration of the sustainment brigade's efforts to ensure division operations were being fully supported. Although the sustainment brigade SPO accomplished this through close coordination with the division G4, it did not completely promote the sustainment brigade staff's situational awareness of division operations.<sup>8</sup> The challenge was not the command and control relationship, but coordination issues between the supported and supporting unit. The SB commander or his deputy must coordinate directly at the supported command level to ensure he understands the division's commander's intent. This should ensure that his entire SB

staff better understands division operations, enhancing a more common operating picture for the entire logistics team in theater.

#### Logistics Organization/Equipment Changes

As a Support Operations Officer (SPO) in an FSB under the AOE structure and a Battalion Commander of a BSB under the new modularity design, I would judge the current logistics modular structure of the Brigade Support Battalions to be a great success thus far. The Army's decision to transform into a new expeditionary Army capable of deploying self sufficient modular brigades rapidly to fight and win decisively, was revolutionary. By consolidating all logistics support capability from the FSBs and MSB in the Division Support Command (DISCOM) into one single BSB, the support structure grew in size by over 300 percent in personnel and by over 400 percent in equipment. This increase equated to enhanced supply, fuel and maintenance management, ammunition, distribution and medical functions, signal and communications systems, and most importantly, planning capabilities. The increase in personnel also allowed me as a commander to plan, develop and execute a more comprehensive training and support strategy for the unit.

When I was a BSB commander in a Stryker Brigade, my most important challenge was the integration of new personnel and new equipment. We transformed from 194 to 630 Soldiers and from over 200 pieces of equipment to well over 850. The BSB fielded many new enablers that included the Battle Command Sustainment Support System (BCS3), the Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), and the Movement Tracking System (MTS) which improved our support capability in requisitioning and asset visibility. Most importantly, the BSB was fielded more weapon systems, night

vision devices and vehicle protection which increased our survivability and lethality on the battlefield; a capability that FSBs never had prior to transformation. This was a very painful process because although our capabilities and responsibilities increased, there was no corresponding increase in the experience or capabilities of our subordinate leaders and new soldiers. With the high personnel turnover up front, most of the personnel being lower enlisted grades, we lost some of our capability to conduct the support mission. We were building an entire new unit with Stryker-like capabilities. The training on new equipment and digital capabilities was a challenge as well. Since Army doctrine had not caught up with the pace of technology, it was critical for me to determine the best way to organize our battalion to take advantage of its technical capabilities while providing the most effective support to the Stryker Brigade and enhancing the survivability skills of the logistics soldiers.

As a BSB Commander, our unit's transformation was not just about receiving new and improved equipment and state of the art systems of systems. It was about shifting from a Cold War mentality to full spectrum combat operations, and training my soldiers to support and survive on the OIF battlefield to which we were scheduled to deploy. In order for the unit to be successful, we had to change the way our subordinate leaders think, organize, support, fight and lead. To accomplish this in the BSB required a shift in our logistics culture and I made it clear to my brigade commander that I wanted to embed every training event that we conducted with the maneuver units in the brigade. The BSB's training strategy consisted of the big five and it was fully nested with the Stryker brigade's training strategy. The big five focus areas consisted of physical fitness training, marksmanship, medical training, small unit battle drills and digital

training for our communication systems. We also incorporated leader's professional development training, leadership courses, intelligence and language training, counseling training and family readiness group training. Every soldier in our unit was trained on close quarter marksmanship and close quarter battle. Both training events included night fire with NVDs. Every soldier also participated in combative training, numerous 12-15 mile road marches with full combat load, drown-proofing and water survival, weight training and convoy live fires, day and night. Each company commander participated in a five day maneuver training event with the BCT which included numerous unmounted movement to contact missions, close quarter marksmanship (day and night), 20 mile road marches and medical training. These training events allowed the BSB to build a high performing organization that valued learning and team building.

The command relationship also changed when the DISCOMs went away, formalizing the habitual support to the BCT by assigning the support battalion within the maneuver brigade. In my opinion, this was a good decision, although other logisticians may not think so. As the SPO in the FSB, I had the mission of planning for and supporting two brigade sized units; the DISCOM and an Infantry brigade. My main focus was to support the maneuver brigade commander using the intent and philosophy of the DISCOM commander. There were two issues with this concept. The first issue was that our SPO cell in the FSB was not robust enough to plan for and manage sustainment operations for an Infantry brigade and at the same time, conduct DISCOM mission taskings. The second and most important issue was that our FSB commander had a weak relationship with the maneuver commanders in the Infantry Brigade because there

was no habitual relationship between the maneuver commanders and the logistics commander. In addition, the FSB commander could not grasp the Common Operating Picture of tactical operations of the entire Infantry brigade because he was focused on mission taskings and training within the DISCOM units. My position as the FSB SPO allowed me to stay nested in the brigade's plan as I spent 75 percent of my time in the brigade Tactical Operations Center (TOC) and 25 percent of my time in the FSB TOC. I conducted most of the commander's update for our FSB commander because I was nested in the entire plan. As a BSB commander working directly for the Stryker brigade commander and working with my fellow maneuver battalion commanders, the mission was clear. As I worked day to day with all five maneuver commanders, the relationships we built and maintained were extraordinary and it allowed the subordinate leaders under my command to focus on one brigade.

As the DISCOM went away, so did the CSGs. The headquarters element of the DISCOM and CSG formed the new structure for the Sustainment Brigade (SB). The SB is a multifunctional sustainment organization consisting of a headquarters with a mission to plan, coordinate, synchronize, monitor Combat Service Support and facilitate the rapid replenishment requirements of BCTs in the BDE/DIV area of operations. Sustainment brigades are assigned to TSCs with a support relationship to Divisional units in the area of operations. The 45<sup>th</sup> Sustainment brigade in Hawaii had one subordinate multifunctional battalion assigned to it when I was the 25<sup>th</sup> ID G4, but it was recently detached and assigned to another unit as the 45<sup>th</sup> SB prepared for deployment to Afghanistan. The Army should reconsider the organizational design of the sustainment brigades if its mission to rapidly support the BCTs remains the same. The



SBs must be resourced with fixed multifunctional support battalions in order to have the habitual relationships. The fixed structure would enable the SB to build a team capable of a strong effective relationship with the BCTs it will support. If the 25<sup>th</sup> ID had a more functional SB that provided additional support to our BCTs in preparation for their current deployment to OIF, I believe the brigades would have been better prepared for their deployment.

#### Changes in G4 Roles and Responsibilities

As we shifted to the new modular support concept under transformation, there were many challenges that I had to work through as the Division G4. Our G4 staff could not execute all logistics tasks without the assistance and support of every logistics agency in our area; specifically, the Sustainment Brigade. As the DISCOM went away, many of their logistics planning and coordination tasks shifted to the Division G4, without the personnel to support the entire logistics mission.

As the G4 of the 25<sup>th</sup> ID, my main issue was that the G4 section had remained at its Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) strength of twenty-four personnel. The shortfalls in the G4 section affected the capability to monitor and track readiness effectively, track and manage RESET operations with our redeploying units and most importantly, managing property accountability. There were also many commodities that the G4 was still responsible for from the division's perspective, but sometime had little influence over because the service or commodity was now controlled by another agency. The Management Review File (MRF), which was controlled by the division G8, was an issue because the G8 and I could not agree on system parameters setting guidance within the Standard Army Retail Supply System. The G8 had stricter guidance

than the units and the G4 staff requested, but the G4 staff convinced the DCG-S to allow the units more flexibility with priorities and spending. The Central Issue Facility (CIF), which was controlled by the Directorate of Logistics (DOL), was an issue because they initially did not accept the G4's SGM input on the Soldier's equipment and uniform menu. This caused our units to not have the proper equipment when field training and live fire exercises were being conducted. The Installation Management Command (IMCOM), which controlled facility management, was an issue because they had not included or formally invited the Division staff to their monthly facility meetings. Although we worked through each of the issues, it was painful trying to build a good working relationship with these support agencies.

Although the SPO sections in the BSBs increased from seven to twenty-three in logistics personnel to effectively monitor and track readiness of their respective BCTs and the brigades also received one Property Book Officer and a senior Supply Non-Commissioned Officer from the old DISCOM structure, the division G4 could not leverage the management of these two commodities with the number of assigned personnel. As the G4, I had to co-opt the SB Commander for weekly assistance in the areas of property accountability and material management, so that we had the correct information. I had lost some of the influence to acquire support across the command. I had to persuade the SB Commander to agree to support the division with his materiel management and property accountability assets. My ability to influence the SB commander to support the division depended on two main efforts; our personalities and our relationship. In this case, both were enhanced by the fact that the TSC Commander was one of my former DISCOM commanders.

There were many initiatives that were discussed and agreed to by myself and the SB commander that enabled the logistics community to successfully support the division's focus on its next deployment to OIF. One of these initiatives was the sustainment brigade's ability to conduct weekly assistance visits with BCT Property Book Officers to include Property Book Unit Supply Enhancement (PBUSE) training of unit supply sergeants in the units. The Sustainment Brigade also put a team of contractors together to assist G4 supply with attaining accurate visibility of equipment shortages in the division. In addition, while working in, but not for, the G4 a Department of the Army DA G8 representative assisted G4 supply in this endeavor. Once again, without command and control guidance, the personal and professional working relationship between the DA G8 representative and I was great. The sustainment brigade also took responsibility of the monthly Logistics Readiness Review (LOGROUND) briefings that were chaired by the DCG –S and the G4. The LOGROUND was used as a tool to show sustainment trends and issues as it pertained to maintenance, supply, transportation, ammunition, property accountability, LBE and RESET. The sustainment brigade SPO with the help of the maintenance, supply and RESET officer in the G4 consolidated the information with coordination of all supported units and briefed the trends and issues to the division logistics leadership. Although we went from a unit relationship to a supporting-supported relationship between the 25<sup>th</sup> ID and the 45<sup>th</sup> SB, we certainly had a great personal and professional working relationship and it was apparent.

The division also had a good working relationship with the U.S. Army Material Command (AMC) representative within the Logistics Support Element (LSE). The

commander that was in charge of the LSE was a good friend of mine and she was very supportive of the division and its BCTs. Although my responsibility as the G4 was to ensure the division had a sound RESET plan, I depended on the LSE commander and her civilian employees to manage the BCT's equipment and ensure their equipment was returned so that units could conduct their collective training. There were some flaws with the RESET plan in that some of the equipment such as the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) could not be returned to the BCT for collective training because of the higher priority of other deploying units, but most issues were understood by the division and brigade leadership. The Left Behind Equipment (LBE) program which was also controlled by AMC had many issues in the beginning. The issues occurred because the program was in the process of being changed over from DOL to AMC and the MANTECH Corporation<sup>9</sup>. Again, this support was successful in the end on the account of a good personal and professional relationship between the LSE commander and staff and the division G4. The relationships with other logistics agencies in our area were not as grand as with the sustainment brigade and AMC.

#### Installation Units Relationships

One attribute as the division G4 was my ability to work with support agencies who had taken responsibility for services and logistics tasks formally under the old DISCOM construct. These agencies were IMCOM, and DOL. The Directorate of Logistics had taken mission responsibility over CIF, the packaged POL warehouse and the Class IV construction material yard. The Installation Management Command had taken responsibility for all tenant units, facilities and training areas on post of which the division was located. It would take a team effort to execute all the operational and post

tasks between the supported and supporting units. This not only sometimes caused issues with the division G4, but with the division G3 as well.

As the division G4, these were the support agencies that I initially could not get my arms around and had to ask for help from higher. The main issue was that I could not figure out who was setting the priorities. In my opinion, IMCOM had no standardization in policies and procedures. Occasionally, I had to get the DCG-S involved in regards to some commodities owned by DOL, specifically CIF. One example of a CIF issue was that incoming soldiers of the division could not properly train and meet the training standards without being issued the proper safety equipment such as goggles, gloves, footwear and Individual Outer Tactical Vests (IOTV). Often times, CIF had gone zero balance of this equipment and had not reordered the stock to be put back on the shelves and issued to soldiers. This caused problems with the green-tab leadership and the division commander himself had to get involved.

Another example was concerns with the issue, turn in and direct exchange hours of CIF which seemed to convenience the civilian workers, but not the leadership and soldiers. During the many sessions that were conducted to discuss and fix the problems, the personal and professional relationships grew stronger amongst the DOL and G4 staff and we all came to fix the issues without an inconvenience to the soldiers and the DOL employees. Again, it took a team effort to support the divisional units on the installation. The DOL was established to provide quality service to all soldiers, 100 percent of the time and find new and better ways of doing business.<sup>10</sup> After months of coordinated efforts between the G4 staff, DOL and the Installation Commander, CIF

procedures made great improvements, but only through good personal relationships between the G4 staff, DOL and IMCOM.

Facility management was yet another issue that impacted both the division G3 and the division G4. When IMCOM was established on Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, it took over the mission of managing all facilities and training areas on Schofield Barracks; a mission that used to be the responsibility of the division commander as his role of the installation commander. This was another area where general officers had to get involved and if for the fact that they did not, some of our division units would not have gotten space to conduct maintenance operations on their equipment. In fact, Schofield Barracks was too small to outfit and house all divisional units and all new units such as the TSC. This is most likely an Army-wide issue considering the recent Base Realignment and Closures (BRAC) and movement of units from one area to another. There was no initial set policy or regulation that governed the new roles and responsibilities between the division staff as the supported unit and the supporting agencies under IMCOM. It would take a long coordinating process between the supported and supporting units to work out the issues of prioritization and tasking authority for all tenant units. For the most part, the issues were worked out. It took a lot of good personal and professional relationships to make it a success.

#### Command and Control Relationships

For command and control, the logistics force changed during our Army's transformation. The AOE structure had FSBs, MSBs, DISCOMs, CSBs, CSGs, COSCOMS and TSCs. Every level of logistics command worked for and reported to the operational unit it supported. Forward and Main Support Battalions reported to

DISCOMs, DISCOMs reported to divisions and COSCOMs reported to Corps. Under the modular construct, the logistics C2 and organizational names changed. When the DISCOMs went away, the BSBs were formed. Now the BSB is assigned and reports directly to the BCT maneuver commander. Since the Army's transformation's focus point is on the brigade, the logistics community and its leaders have empowered the BCTs by giving the BSBs a more robust capability to make the BCTS more self sustaining for a longer period of time. A self sustaining unit is one that is able to support itself without additional augmentation from other organizations. Under this concept, the BSB commander now reports to one brigade commander instead of two, as he did under the AOE construct. As stated previously, working directly for the maneuver brigade commander keeps you focused on the training and mission of that BCT. As a BSB commander, I was ultimately involved week to week in the training plans and execution of all five maneuver battalions as well as my own. The BSB's training and support plan was fully nested with the BCT and I fully understood the BCT commander's intent and vision on a daily basis. The daily and weekly interaction with my fellow battalion commanders allowed me to establish an unprecedented relationship with each individual and as the senior logistician in the group, they depended on me every day and the trust we established was immense. Our Stryker brigade performed all its mission requirements because the reorganized structure of the BSB, for the most part, allowed for a self sufficient organization.

### Materiel Management

One of the focus areas I did not get the chance to fix before I departed the 25<sup>th</sup> ID was materiel management. With the transformation to the Modular Force Army, the

division headquarters was reorganized to provide a more joint capability but it did not provide any additional logistics management capabilities; specifically the materiel management and property accountability capabilities that once belonged to the DISCOM. The Division Materiel Management Center (DMMC) which consisted of over 35 personnel provided centralized and synchronized supply and maintenance management for all divisional units. Under the modular construct, the Materiel Management Centers were deactivated and the division G4 given the responsibility of this function without any increase in personnel. The one question I had as the G4 was what unit would be conducting garrison support of material management functions. Although our division received assistance from the sustainment brigade in regards to materiel management and property accountability, my thought was that the newly formed Theater Support Command should be providing this sustainment support in garrison. I attempted to build a working relationship with the G4 and SPO from the TSC on numerous occasions. I would invite their logistics leadership (Colonels) to every LOGROUND, RESET sessions, Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) Conferences and Logistics Readiness Councils (LRCs), but would only get attendance from logistics Majors and Captains. As the G4, I did meet with the TSC's SPO and G4 on three occasions to discuss their roles, responsibilities and command relationships with the division. As I departed the G4 position after one year, I did not think the relationships were articulated and published in policy.

#### Centralized and Decentralized Operations in the BSB

Under the AOE construct, most logistics operations were planned and executed as centralized operations. Forward Support Battalions would support from the Brigade



Support Areas (BSA) with attachments of the field trains from the maneuver units and the Main Support Battalions would support from the Division Support Area (DSA) in the division rear. Our logistics motto of “supporting forward in the foxhole” came to be known during the Persian Gulf War or sometime thereafter. With the new logistics concept came the new modular logistic force, the BSB. As the BSB organization grew in its personnel and equipment, the Army decided to form Forward Support Companies (FSC) in the IBCTs and HBCTs and Combat Repair Teams (CRT) and Field Fielding Teams (FFT) in the SBCTs. This concept allowed for the decentralization of logistics support to begin.

As a BSB commander in the SBCT, in conjunction with the brigade commander’s guidance, all logistics operations were to be decentralized. Although all of our personnel were assigned to the BSB in garrison, we attached our CRT and FFT personnel to each maneuver battalion in the brigade and they would work day to day operations in their respective maneuver battalion areas of operations. The CRTs were led by a Warrant Officer with a Sergeant First Class and the FFT was led by a Sergeant First Class. Warrant Officer assignments to a maneuver battalion were experience and personality driven. I had to ensure that the personalities between the Warrant Officer and the maneuver battalion commander and executive officer were similar, and that critical decision made for great success for both units. All of our CRT and FFT leadership understood my guidance and intent as the battalion commander and they were fully trusted and empowered to execute their daily mission without checking in with the BSB leadership. As for the rating scheme, the maneuver battalion executive officer rated the

warrant officer and I was the senior rater which worked out well. The entire decentralization of logistics operations worked well in the SBCT.

### Recommendations and Conclusions

Transformation is about changing and providing capabilities to the Army to conduct successful military operations across the full spectrum of conflict. As mentioned earlier, all logistics operations in the SBCT I commanded in was decentralized under the new modular structure of the BSB. The entire decentralization of logistics worked well in the SBCT and the concept should be followed by other SBCTs in the Army.

The logistics community has changed its support concept of having a single logistics commander in theater, who is overall responsible for logistics in a given area of responsibility. This concept has affected the habitual relationships between divisions and supporting units above the division level. The logistics community has important requirements that should be reconsidered and resourced to facilitate the improved capabilities of our maneuver, and force sustainment forces.

The first recommendation is to resource and increase the number of personnel in the division G4 section. The G4 must be fully resourced to accomplish the old DISCOM mission of materiel management, tracking readiness, managing property accountability and also a section to manage RESET and Support Operations. This would allow for better overall management and expertise to assist the BCTs.

The second recommendation is that the Army considers reorganizing the division staff structure, replacing the current G-staff with principal officers, one in charge of operations and the other, force sustainment. One principle officer would lead and manage the maneuver planning and operations structure (G3, G2 and G5); and the

other principle officer would manage force sustainment (G4, G1, G7 and G8). This would allocate a single point of management for maneuver to include operations, intelligence, plans and civil affairs. It would also allocate a single point of management for force sustainment to include logistics, personnel and medical, force modernization and budget. Having two principal officers in the division staff structure would streamline all operations for the division and its BCTs.

Thirdly, the Army should reconsider the organizational design of the Sustainment Brigade by resourcing them with fixed multifunctional support battalions to enable them to train together and build habitual relationships with the BCTs in garrison operations. The Army should also attempt to deploy these organizations in the same Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle to maintain that habitual relationship. The peril of collocating modular sustainment and maneuver forces in the same location assumes that the units will be a team upon deployment.

Lastly, there needs to be a policy or Army doctrine that discusses the roles and responsibilities of the division and its relationships with Sustainment Brigades, Theater Support Commands, Army Materiel Command and Installation Management Commands. This doctrine should discuss the command and control relationships as well as the specific mission functions of each agency and how each function may overlap. Effective habitual relationships have been the single most important factor when dealing with logistics senior leaders.

This personal experience monograph reviewed some lessons learned from ODS and OIF and how logistics transformation changed and affected logistics units at the division level and below as well as reviewing changes in the division G4 roles and

responsibilities. It examined command and control relationships between the Division, Sustainment Brigade and the Theater Support Command with the loss of the DISCOM and the direct command and control structure it once had. It also examined the working relationships and unique personalities between the supported and supporting agencies in a garrison environment such as IMCOM and AMC.

The recommendations mentioned above, if considered, would allow for better management of logistics operations as well as a better understanding of a process to define roles, responsibilities and relationships between supported and supporting agencies. Fortunately, most senior level logisticians understand the importance of relationships very well. The challenge is that we have changed the way we conduct sustainment business and we as logisticians must ensure that it works effectively and efficiently.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Francis J. Harvey and General Peter J. Schoomaker, *The United States Army Posture Statement, Fiscal Year 2007*, Posture Statement presented to 110th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2007), addendum K.

<sup>2</sup> Major Frankie Ras, Army Transportation, interview by author, Schofield Barracks, HI, August 2007.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> The MANTECH Corporation is a provider of technical services to the U.S Army. The agency provides property accountability expertise and is the major hand receipt holder for any

25<sup>th</sup> ID unit that leaves equipment behind in garrison once they have been deployed to combat operations.

<sup>10</sup> *Directorate of Logistics*, <http://sill-www.army.mil/DOL/> (accessed Dec 28, 2008).

